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but that a strict compliance with its terms will not be required
where the facts or exceptional cases justify a deviation or where
the substantial purpose of the requirement has been met.
R.O.R.
LEGISLATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMENDMENT BY IMPLICA-
TION-Act 26 of 1914 provided for defrayal of the expenses and
salary of the State Fire Marshal from the proceeds of a tax therein
levied on fire insurance companies doing business in the state.'
The fire marshal drew warrants against the proceeds of this tax.
The state treasurer refused to honor the warrants, relying upon
provisions in the 1940 general appropriation act2 which repealed
all laws providing for continuing appropriations" and made an ap-
propriation to the State Fire Marshal conditioned upon his sur-
render of all unencumbered funds in his possession or thereafter
collected.4 On suit of the fire marshal for mandamus, held, the
writ was properly issued to compel payment of the warrants. The
provisions of the general appropriation act cannot be considered
as amending Act 26 of 1914, for such a result would violate the
provision of the Louisiana constitution relating to amendment of
a prior law by reference.' State ex rel. Fournet v. Tugwell, 5 So.
(2d) 370 (La. 1941) 6
1. La. Act 26 of 1914, § 7 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3545].
2. La. Act 44 of 1940.
3. Id. at § 11: "All continuing appropriations in existence at the time of
the adoption of this Act are hereby expressly discontinued and any provision
of law making or purporting to make any such appropriation is hereby re-
pealed with a view to compliance with the provisions of the Constitution
prohibiting the making of any appropriation for a longer period than two
years."
4. Id. at § 5: "There are hereby appropriated from the State General
Fund, the following amounts. .. ; provided, however, that such appropria-
tions shall be payable out of the State General Fund only on the condition
that there shall have been deposited in the State General Fund, all unen-
cumbered balances on hand as of June 30, 1940, and on the further, condition
that all fees and other receipts of the respective agencies which shall be col-
lected during the period July 1, 1940, through June 30, 1942, shall be deposited
with the State Treasurer to the credit of the State General Fund. The
transfer of such balances and departmental receipts to the State General
Fund is hereby authorized and directed by the Legislature." The State Fire
Marshal is thereafter listed for a specified appropriation.
The general appropriation act also contained the familiar repealing
clause, applying to "all laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith." La. Act
44 of 1940, § 15.
5. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 17.
6. It is the purpose of this note to consider only the rationale of the de-
cision, not the correctness of the result. In addition to the argument relied
upon by the court, relator's counsel contended that (1) the legislature in-
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The doctrine that amendments by implication are precluded
by the constitutional prohibition against amendment by reference
is a potential threat to effective legislative action and to many
basic portions of the statutory framework of Louisiana law. The
Louisiana constitution embodies the now familiar injunction' that
"No law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title, but
in such cases the act revived, or section as amended, shall be re-
enacted and published at length." It is generally agreed that such
provisions were designed to make amendments intelligible on
their face and so to remedy a prevalent legislative evil, amend-
ment of prior statutes by the mere specification of alterations
without reference to context, the so-called "blind" amendment.'
tended to repeal only appropriations made in violation of Article III, Section
I of the Louisiana constitution, and that the provision here involved was not
such an "appropriation," but, indeed, a constitutional "dedication"; (2) incor-
poration of provisions repealing or amending prior acts in the general appro-
priation act violated Article IV, Section 9 of the Louisiana constitution,
which provides that "the general appropriation shall embrace nothing but
appropriations for the ordinary expenses of the government. . ."; (3) the
same provision was violated in that the appropriation or dedication here in-
volved originated in a separate bill and must be so repealed; (4) since the
title of the act did not indicate the purpose of repealing or amending any
prior laws, incorporation of these provisions violated Article III, Section
16 of the Louisiana constitution, which provides that every law shall em-
brace but one object and shall have a title indicative of such object, See
Original Brief on behalf of Appellee, State ex rel. Fournet v. Tugwell, 5 So.
(2d) 370 (La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 36,436, 1941). The court said: "There are
many other points raised by the relator which demonstrate that the defense
of the respondents is not well founded. It is not necessary for use to con-
sider these additional points in view of the conclusion we have reached."
7. Twenty-eight other states are listed in (1932) 59 C.J. 863, vo statutes, §
446, as having similar provisions. Louisiana is credited with having been the
first state to adopt such a provision. Freund, Standards of American Legis-
lation (1917) 155n.
8. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 17. The provision does not require re-
publication of the act as it stands before amendment, but only "as amended."
Village of South Highlands v. Lagier, 156 La. 150, 100 So. 287 (1924). See
Arnoult v. New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 54, 56 (1856); State ex rel. Mouton v.
Read, 49 La. Ann. 1535, 1537, 22 So. 761 (1897).
9. State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 405, 47 P.(2d) 637, 644
(1935); State ex rel. Breene v. Howard, 67 Okla. 289, 292, 171 Pac. 30, 33 (1918).
See also 1 Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations (8 ed. 1927) 314;
Freund, op. cit. supra note 7, at 156; Horack, Constitutional Limitations on
Legislative Procedure in West Virginia (1933) 39 W. Va. L. Q. 294, 305; Jones,
Statute Law Making in the United States (1923) 173; Notes (1930) 43 Harv. L.
Rev. 482, 483; (1931) 43 Id. 1143.
See La. Act 70 of 1843 for an example of this type of enactment: "That
article three thousand one hundred and eighty-four of the Civil Code be so
amended as to insert in the first paragraph, after the word 'overseer,' the
following words: 'and debts due for necessary supplies furnished to any
farmer plantation.'" Another type of amendatory statute prevalent at the
time is exemplified by La. Act 20 of 1844: "That the Article two thousand
three hundred and four of the Civil Code be... so amended as to make the
English of said Article correspond with the French, and so as to make co-
trespassers liable in solido."
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Since this method lends itself so readily to deception of legislators
and the public, to the miscarriage of intended legislative objects,
and to blind legislative action," the proscription accords with
sound legislative practice by eliminating pernicious procedure
permissible in the absence of constitutional limitation."'
Confined to its original purpose, the constitutional mandate is
easily understood and observed.12 But the incessant hammering at
legislative enactment has pounded statutes repeatedly against this
anvil. The courts have generally restricted the successful use of
the provision to its intended object."' The constitutionality of
amendment by implication has been repeatedly sustained where
the subsequent statute was in itself "complete and intelligible"
without reference to other legislation.1 4 This incontestable propo-
sition has not seemed conclusive enough, however, in the presence
of occasional aberration,"3 and a body of rationalization based on
the peculiar nature or subject of the statute at hand has been de-
veloped. Thus it has been held that the provision does not apply to
statutes which do not amend a prior law but merely incorporate
its provisions by reference; that acts which supplement or add to
10. Freund, Legislative Regulation (1932) 206. Jones, loc. cit. supra note 9.
See also authorities cited supra note 9.
11. First State Bank of Shelby v. Bottineau County Bank, 56 Mont. 363,
185 Pac. 162, 8 A.L.R. 631 (1919). See Fletcher v. Prather, 102 Cal. 413, 415, 36
Pac. 658, 659 (1894).
12. Freund, Supplemental Acts (1914) 8 Ill. L. Rev. 507.
13. See, for example, a discussion of the conflicting Nebraska decisions
in Merrill, Legislation: Subject, Title and Amendment (1934) 13 Neb. L. Bull.
95, 126. The situation in Nebraska is rendered more difficult by the added
constitutional requirement that "the section or sections so amended shall be
repealed." Neb. Const., Art. III, § 11.
14. Louisiana cases are cited infra note 20. Tuskaloosa Bridge Co. v.
Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9, 18 (1867); People ex rel. McDonough v. Beemesterboer,
356 Ill. 432, 190 N.E. 920 (1934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 575, 55 S.Ct. 86, 79 L.Ed.
673 (1934), rehearing denied 293 U.S. 630, 55 S.Ct. 138, 79 LEd. 716 (1934);
State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 47 P.(2d) 637 (1935). See also
text and cases cited In Cooley, op. cit. supra note 9, at 315; Jones, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 197; Mason, Legislative Bill Drafting (1926) 14 Calif. L. Rev.
298, 310; 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2 ed. by Lewis, 1904) 446, § 239.
15. See a discussion of the Illinois decisions In Freund, supra note 12.
See Merrill, supra note 13, for a discussion of the Nebraska decisions. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Beal v. Bauman, 126 Neb. 566, 254 N.W. 256 (1934).
16. Kathman v. New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 145 (1856); State v. De Hart,
109 La. 570, 33 So. 605 (1903); State v. Thrift Oil & Gas Co., 162 La. 165, 110
So. 188, 51 A.L.R. 261 (1926); Campagna v. Baton Rouge, 165 La. 974, 116 So.
403 (1928); State ex rel. Porterie v. GrosJean, 182 La. 298, 161 So. 871 (1935);
Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Otis & Co., 182 Ark. 242, 31 S.W. (2d)
427 (1930); Lynn v. Bullock, 189 Ky. 604, 225 S.W. 733 (1920).
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prior statutes need not set forth the sections supplemented; 1 7 that
it is permissible to repeal a statute by reference or implication.' s
Prior to the decision of State ex rel. Fournet v. Tugwell,9 the
Louisiana courts had not considered amendment by implication
proscribed.2 Manifest completeness and intelligibility, not latent
effect, has been considered the proper test. The changed view
adopted by the Fournet case presents manifest difficulties. How
is amendment to be distinguished from partial repeal ?21 How
may basic policy changes be effectuated?22 Must the pertinent
sections of every prior statute on the subject be set forth at length
and expressly altered?
The wisdom of thorough consideration of the effect of a con-
17. Dehon v. Lafourche Basin Levee Board, 110 La. 767, 34 So. 770 (1903);
State v. Hardy, 174 La. 458, 141 So. 27 (1932); State v. Pasta, 44 Idaho 671,
258 Pac. 1075 (1927); People v. Folignos, 322 Ill. 304, 153 N.E. 373 (1926);
Hughes v. Marvin, 216 Ky. 190, 287 S.W. 561 (1926).
18. Commercial Bank of Natchez v. Markham, 3 La. Ann. 698 (1848);
White River Lumber Co. v. White River Drainage Dist., 141 Ark. 196, 216
S.W. 1043 (1919); Barron v. Smith, 103 Md. 317, 70 AtI. 225 (1908): Patten v.
Withycombe, 81 Ore. 210, 159 Pac. 78 (1916). Cf. Hicks v. Davis, 97 Kan. 312,
154 Pac. 1030 (1916), rehearing denied 97 Kan. 662, 156 Pac. 774 (1916) based
on Kan. Const., Art. II, § 16, providing for repeal of sections amended.
19. 5 So.(2d) 370 (La. 1941).
20. State v. Cunningham, 130 La. 749, 58 So. 558 (1912); State v. J. Foto &
Bro., 134 La. 154, 63 So. 859 (1914); Calcasieu Trust & Savings Bank v.
Wetherell, 139 La. 454, 71 So. 765 (1916); Whittington v. Louisiana Sawmill
Co., Ltd., 142 La. 322, 76 So. 754 (1917); Clark v. City of Opelousas, 147 La. 2,
84 So. 433 (1920); Moss v. Levin, 10 La. App. 149, 119 So. 558 (1929), rehearing
denied 10 La. App. 149, 120 So. 258 (1929); State ex rel. Porterie v. Housing
Authority of New Orleans, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938). Compare the fol-
lowing cases, sustaining validity of the enactment where the purpose to
amend was stated in the title only and the body of the statute was drawn as
an independent act. Murphy v. Police Jury, St. Mary Parish, 118 La. 401, 42
So. 979 (1906); Roth v. Town of Thibodaux, 137 La. 210, 68 So. 412 (1915);
Shreveport v. NeJin, 140 La. 785, 73 So. 996 (1917). [But see Walker v. Cald-
well, 4 La. Ann. 297 (1849)]. See also State v. Judge of Eighth Judicial Dis-
trict, 14 La. Ann. 486, 487 (1859); Moore v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 726
(1880); Wachsen v. Commission Council of Lake Charles, 162 La. 823, 111
So. 177 (1926); Shanchell v. Lewis Amusement Co., Inc., 171 So. 426 (La. App.
1936). Compare Kohn v. Mayor and Council of Town of Carrolltown, 10 La.
Ann. 719 (1855), where a professedly amendatory act attempted to amend
part of a section of a prior statute; In the Matter of Reilly and Leblanc, 2
McGloin 89 (La. App. 1883), where a statute attempted to reduce salaries
fixed by prior act by simply stating a percentage reduction.
21. See, e.g., State v. Judge of Eighth Judicial District, 14 La. Ann. 486
(1859); Calcasieu Trust & Savings Bank v. Wetherell" 139 La. 454, 71 So. 765
(1916); Whittington v. Louisiana Sawmill Co.; Ltd., 142 La. 322, 76 So. 754
(1917).
22. Consider, for example, the problems which might be created if the
legislature, in order to effectuate the basic policy behind the Women's Eman-
cipatory Acts (La. Acts 94 of 1916, 244 of 1912, 219 of 1920, 34 of 1921 (E.S.)
[Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2167-2168], 132 of 1926, 283 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§§ 2169-2173]) were required to amend every Code article and statute refer-
ring or intended to be made applicable to women which was only to be
amended and not repealed.
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templated 'legislative enactment on prior statutes cannot be
doubted.28 But raising a potential constitutional .objection to
amendments by implication presents almost insurmountable bar-
riers to effective legislative action,24 particularly in a civil law
jurisdiction where the vast majority of litigation involves re-
course to legislative enactment. No judge or lawyer, and few lay-
men, need be told that virtually every statute changes prior
law.215 Bringing all change which does not amount to repeal
within the scope of the constitutional provision will make compli-
ance with the mandate a practical impossibility in many situa-
tions.
A thorough judicial reconsideration of the constitutionality
of amendments by implication with a more complete analysis of
the legal and practical problems involved is imperative. Certainly
some clear statement concerning if, when, and to what extent
amendment by implication is permissible is indispensable to ef-
fective legislative action at the approaching session.
A.B.R.
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT-EVICTION OF SOL-
DIERS' BUSINESS FROM COMMERCIAL PREMISES-Action was brought
to evict Streiffer from his leased business premises on the ground
that he handled and sold children's wear and hardware in viola-
23. The problem of giving notoriety to the substance of the proposed
change has received attention. See Horack, Cases and Materials on Legisla-
tion (1940) 657. Generally accepted methods adopt various means of bringing
changes to the legislator's attention on final printing of a proposed bill and
to the attention of the public in the official publication of the statute passed.
Among the methods adopted: (1) Deleted matter is printed in brackets and a
line drawn through it. New matter is italicized. Upon final publication, the
italics remain and omissions are indicated by asterisks. (2) Excised matter
Is published in brackets. (3) Changes are indicated in footnotes. (4) Blind
amendment is used but the act as amended is also published in full. See
Note (1931) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1143, 1146. These methods are helpful, so far as
they go. But are they not, in substance, rather inadequate attempts to deal
with the more fundamental problem of achieving skillful preparation and
thorough consideration of all legislation? Query, whether it would not be
more helpful to have the aid of a well-prepared committee report on each
statute, indicating its nature and policy, and changes it will effectuate in ex-
isting law whether or not It is framed as an amendment.
24. Merrill, supra note 13, at 106-107. See also State ex rel. Normile v.
Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 47 P.(2d) 637 (1935).
25. See Merrill, supra note 13, at 126: "unfortunately, the corpulence of
the statute-books, the catholicity of legislative activity, the inevitable inter-
jacence of all the human concerns of which the law and lawmaker take cog-
nizance, all combine to insure that very rarely is it possible to enact a statute
which does not, often in the' most unforeseen manner, impinge upon prior
legislation." See also Horack, supra note 9, at 307.
